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Manipulative Imputations in a Distributed Decision Support Setting: 
The Effects of Information Asymmetry and Information Aggregation Complexity 
 
Abstract: 
According to earlier research, distributed decision support structures are susceptible to 
deception. We complement the existing works by analyzing group members' attempts to 
manipulate group decisions supported by distributed communications. Experimentally, we 
manipulated two systemic features of a distributed support structure: the members' information 
asymmetry and decision rule complexity. Both of these features refer to structural properties of 
aggregated information exchange. We confirmed several hypothesized effects: An increase in the 
information asymmetry in the aggregation of information increases the incidence of the members' 
manipulative tendency. It also increases the effectiveness of the members' manipulative 
imputations. However, the complexity of a decision rule negatively moderates both of these 
effects. We point out the theoretical relevance and managerial implications of our findings. We 
conclude that managing team members' information asymmetry and complexity of issues under 
their practical consideration may result in valuable disclosures. 
Key Words: deception; manipulative imputations; information aggregation; information 
asymmetry; decision rule complexity; lab experiment; 
1. Introduction 
Deceptive behaviors arguably constitute a thorny issue in modern societies (Griffith & 
Peterson, 2006). Deception effectively refers to ‘‘a communicator’s deliberate attempt to foster in 
others a belief or understanding which the communicator considers to be untrue’’ (DePaulo & 
DePaulo, 1989, p. 1553). In this respect, it can be seen as an intentional act that occurs when a 
focal actor create a desired effect, by controlling information in a message (Carlson et al., 2004; 
Miller & Stiff, 1983). 
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As the unique characteristics of the Internet (e.g. its low entry barriers, spatial/temporal 
separation, and anonymity) facilitate deceptive acts, such acts have largely been examined in the 
context of e-commerce (Pavlou & Gefen, 2005; Xiao & Benbasat, 2011). Nonetheless, recent 
studies have also started to examine deceptive acts within group decision support system (GDSS) 
settings. Examples of the latter include the study of deception in corporate prediction markets 
(O’Leary, 2015) and online preference markets, i.e., virtual markets established to collect 
participants' preference on virtual stocks representing items of interest (Chen et al., 2013). Earlier 
GDSS works have stressed the need to examine deceptive acts in GDSS settings, given that “the 
decisions that are guided by the GDSS may only be as good as the information that is exchanged” 
(Barkhi et al., 1998, p. 223). 
Our study largely seeks to contribute to this line of research by providing a better 
understanding of the antecedents behind the genesis of deceptive acts in GDSS. As we also 
illustrate in the next section, a number of studies examined several factors that make individuals 
more susceptible to deception (Biros et al., 2002; George et al., 2014; Giboney et al., 2015; 
Vishwanath et al., 2011). They also examined the potential held by different technology features 
to aid individuals in detecting deception (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2010; Twyman et al., 2014; 
Zhou et al., 2004). However, as the literature on online deception reveals, little is known in terms 
of understanding how group members can make use of technology features to deceive. In other 
words, more needs to be known about how technology features cause individuals to submit 
inauthentic information within group settings. 
In light of the above, the focus of this paper is to understand how systemic GDSS 
features may inhibit or motivate an individual group member to impute inauthentic information. 
Our study examines such imputations during instances of information aggregation, as the pooling 
of information over many individuals making a group decision is referred to (Bettencourt, 2009; 
Csaszar & Eggers, 2013). In particular, it examines the effects of two systemic GDSS features on 
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the group member’s tendency to deceive: 1) the presence of information asymmetries during the 
aggregation of information, and 2) the complexity characterizing this aggregation. 
The difference between the information transacting parties possess, known as information 
asymmetry (Ba & Pavlou, 2002), has been identified as a likely predictor of deceptive acts 
(Barkhi et al., 1998, 2004). In addition, regulative effects may suppress biased information 
exchange (Silver, 2014). Therefore, under conditions of information asymmetry, the complexity 
of a rule that determines how imputations are aggregated into a group outcome may differentially 
impact the exchange of inauthentic information. 
Our study examines the effects of information asymmetry and decision rule complexity 
on the incidence of a group member submitting inauthentic information. In addition, we 
complement our analysis by examining the effectiveness of a group member’s manipulative 
imputations on a supported group decision. The latter, while important, has been implicitly 
assumed. Hence, findings of this study initially inform GDSS researchers and practitioners on 
how one systemic feature, i.e. the asymmetry of information, may promote a deceptive act. 
Moreover, our study also illustrates the interplay between these two systemic features, 
influencing the group member’s tendency to deceive. Specifically, it shows how the setting of a 
decision rule under conditions of information asymmetry can suppress an individual’s submission 
of inauthentic information.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the following section, we provide a brief 
overview of the findings on deception, and suggest how this applies to GDSS settings. In the 
subsequent section, we develop our hypotheses. In the fourth and fifth section, we explain our 
methodology and results. We then discuss our findings, research contributions, and managerial 
implications, and conclude the paper. 
2. Related Prior Works 
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2.1 Deception and Technology 
The previous works on the relationship between technology and deception followed two 
closely related research streams. One stream investigated characteristics that make individuals 
susceptible to deception. Urgency cues, habitual media use, and high email load play an 
important role in this susceptibility (Vishwanath et al., 2011). The credibility of a sender is also 
an important factor (George et al., 2014).  
The other stream investigated characteristics that assist deception detection, by 
strengthening users’ vigilance (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2010). Warnings about data quality 
combined with just-in-time training enhance deception detection (Biros et al., 2002). However, 
this comes at the cost of a user’s evaluation time, and can increase the number of false alarms 
(Biros et al., 2002). Proposals have also been made for automated deception detection (Zhou et 
al., 2004). Recently proposed credibility assessment systems are capable of detecting individuals’ 
purposely hidden information (Twyman et al., 2014). These systems synthesize the understanding 
of orienting and defensive responses, structured interviewing, and non-invasive 
psychophysiological and behavioral measurements (Twyman et al., 2014). Whereas many 
promising methods can assist deception detection, selecting valuable input variables remains 
unavoidable in enhancing their performance. 
In spite of these important findings, little is known about how individuals appropriate 
technology features to deceive. Our study aims to address this important research gap. 
Specifically, we investigate how technology features cause individual group members to submit 
inauthentic information.   
2.2 Deception in GDSS settings 
Studies of deceptive acts in GDSS settings compared collocated groups and groups 
supported by distributed communications. Group members supported by distributed 
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communications revealed their information less truthfully than collocated group members (Barkhi 
et al., 1998). This difference persisted even if the groups did not have a leader (Barkhi et al., 
2004). Further, a recent study investigated the incidence of deception and the success of deceivers 
in influencing group decisions (Marett & George, 2013). Across the board, the group members 
were abysmally poor at detecting lies submitted during group sessions (Marett & George, 2013). 
Deceivers lied more if their group members were supported by distributed communications. 
However, they were significantly more successful in influencing group decisions if their group 
members were collocated (Marett & George, 2013). A recent numerical analysis showed that 
regulative effects in distributed GDSS settings suppressed the bias of group members’ 
information exchange (Silver, 2014).  
Our study focuses on distributed GDSS settings that encourage the submission of 
inauthentic information. However, rather than comparing the physical features of GDSS settings 
(distributed communications vs. collocated groups) like these previous studies, our study 
examines effects of the systemic features common to the distributed communications. One such 
feature is the presence of information asymmetries during the aggregation of information (Barkhi 
et al., 1998). The other is the decision rule complexity that characterizes this aggregation (Silver, 
2014).  
In bilateral settings, a general requirement for a deceptive act to be effective is that 
deceiving signals generated by a deceiver reach the other party, and affect a decision outcome (Li 
& Cruz, 2009). Only if the deceiver believes that manipulated information will affect the other 
party, will he/she opt to manipulate this information in his/her favor. Moreover, in GDSS settings, 
it is typically understood that the information necessary for a supported group decision to be 
made is distributed among group members. Thus, a supported group decision will be generally 
susceptible to every group member’s imputed information.  
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In light of this condition, the GDSS settings beg two main questions: First, how to 
prevent a group member from imputing inauthentic information? Second, how to suppress the 
effectiveness of this imputation on a supported group decision? Our study addresses both of these 
questions. 
3. Theory and Hypotheses 
By-and-large, decision-making consists of information managing behaviors, i.e. the 
search for and processing of information, and evaluation and implementation of options (Csaszar 
& Eggers, 2013; Gavetti et al., 2007; Simon, 1972, 1997). Intuitively, more information reduces 
uncertainty, and can lead to a better payoff. The value of this information is usually defined 
through the induced payoff difference (Feltham, 1968; Howard, 1966). Many deceptive acts draw 
on the ‘informational leverage’ held over decision-making parties (Clots-Figueras, et al. 2015). 
Such an imbalance is commonly referred to as information asymmetry.  
Information asymmetry pervades distributed GDSS structures (Barkhi et al. 1998). This 
fact has led to hypothesizing that information asymmetry can be a key predictor of deceptive acts 
in a distributed GDSS structure (Barkhi et al. 2004). Siding with this argument, our study treats 
information asymmetry as a dynamic notion that can increase or decrease during an exchange of 
information, and in our case during its aggregation. A thorough understanding of these effects on 
deception requires an examination of changes in information that aggregates into a group 
outcome. 
Our overarching hypothesis is that increased information asymmetry among group 
members will lead to a higher number of deceptive acts. If the pooled information on other 
members’ preferences is disclosed to an individual member, this disclosure reduces his/her 
uncertainty (Li & Cruz, 2009). In addition, the disclosure of their conflicting incentives reveals to 
the individual member an opportunity to exploit his/her ‘informational advantage.’ The member 
responds to this opportunity, by manipulating information, thereby changing a group outcome, 
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and improving his/her payoff (Volz et al., 2015). In other words, the increase in this asymmetry 
may increase the incidence of the member’s attempted manipulation. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize: 
H1a: An increase in information asymmetry during the aggregation of information 
increases a group member’s manipulative tendency. 
As already stated, an increase in information asymmetry occurs by providing the member 
with the information on the remaining members’ conflicting incentives. Besides disclosing to the 
member the opportunity to manipulate group outcomes, this also informs the member of the 
likely consequences of his/her imputations. Specifically, such a disclosure informs the member of 
an imputation that may lead to group outcomes more favorable to him/her. Hence, an increase in 
information asymmetry should also cause the member’s manipulative imputation to be more 
effective. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H1b: An increase in information asymmetry during the aggregation of information 
increases the effectiveness of a group member’s manipulative imputation. 
Either implicitly or explicitly, group decisions require a decision rule. Any such rule 
structures the aggregation of imputed information into a group outcome (Bettencourt, 2009). The 
simplest decision rule may require each group member to impute only a single preference (i.e. 
“Among options a, b, and c, I prefer option b.”). A more complex rule may require each group 
member to impute exhaustively ordered preferences (i.e. “Among options a, b, and c, I prefer 
options b, a, and c, in that order.”). An even more complex rule may require each group member 
to characterize his/her intensity of preferences across an imputed ordering (i.e. “Among options a, 
b, and c, I prefer option b three times more than option a, and option a two times more than 
option c.”). Obviously, the rules differ in the richness of information each member is required to 
impute. In addition, they also differ in the complexity of the aggregation of imputed information 
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(Bettencourt, 2009; Endriss et al., 2012). We argue that this complexity may affect the 
relationship between the information asymmetry and deception. 
Simple rules are known to positively influence group outcomes (Limayem et al., 2006). 
After all, the complexity of a decision rule is inversely related to the efficiency of information 
processing (Conitzer & Sandholm, 2005; Xia & Conitzer, 2010). As implied by the principle of 
bounded rationality, this complexity taxes an individual’s information processing ability (Adler et 
al., 2011; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Simon, 1972). Hence, the more complex the rule, the 
lower is the efficiency of the individual group member’s information processing. This 
consideration also applies to the efficiency of the member’s manipulative responses to any 
disclosed opportunity. As previously explained, the increase in information asymmetry about the 
other members’ conflicting incentives discloses to the member the opportunity to manipulate 
group outcomes. This incentivizes the group member to manipulate information, thereby 
changing a group outcome, and improving his/her payoff. Nonetheless, if this complexity makes 
the member’s information processing less efficient, he/she may also be less likely to respond to 
this opportunity. Hence, we hypothesize: 
H2a: The decision rule complexity negatively moderates the effect of information 
asymmetry on a group member’s manipulative tendency. 
The inverse relationship between the complexity of a decision rule and efficiency of 
information processing also applies to the effectiveness of the group member’s manipulative 
imputation. The disclosure of the remaining members’ conflicting incentives informs the 
member’s evaluation of his/her imputations. The disclosure of the opportunity to favorably 
manipulate group outcomes makes the member more likely to do so. However, the decision rule 
complexity taxes the efficiency of the member’s information processing. This processing includes 
the member’s selection of a manipulative imputation that favorably manipulates a group outcome. 
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Thus, the more complex the rule, the lower is the effectiveness of the member’s manipulative 
imputation. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
H2b: The decision rule complexity negatively moderates the effect of information 
asymmetry on the effectiveness of a group member’s manipulative imputation. 
Figure 1 illustrates our research model. We provide the specification of all the variables 
in the following section. 











Figure 1. The Research Model With Main, Moderating, Control, and Dependent Variables 
 
4. Research Methodology 
4.1 Participants and Experiment Design 
Our hypotheses were tested in a lab experiment. Our 120 participants were graduate 
students from a university in Central Europe. Their mean age was 24.41 (standard deviation = 
4.49). Fifty-nine participants were female (49%) and sixty-one were male (51%). All the 
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imaginary group members. Our treatment was the increased information asymmetry in the 
aggregation of information (low vs. high asymmetry). Our moderator was the decision rule 
complexity (low vs. moderate vs. high rule complexity). Since people differ in their tendency of 
becoming informed (Goldberg, 1993; Northouse, 2007), information asymmetry was varied 
between-participants. On the other hand, the same people may experience different decision 
situations. Thus, the decision rule complexity was varied within-participants. Finally, our 
dependent variables were the manipulative tendency and effectiveness of manipulative 
imputation. 
4.2 Pretesting the Decision Scenarios 
Initially, we devised a number of decision scenarios. Our rationale was for each scenario 
to consist of a specific decision rule and a specific preference arrangement. The previous analyses 
in the social choice (voting) informed our choice of these elements (e.g., Sobel, 2001; Taylor, 
2002, 2005): only if participants imputed inauthentic information could they favorably change a 
group outcome. For the three rules, twelve preference arrangements were selected. This resulted 
in 36 scenarios. Prior to the experiment, we pretested the scenarios three times. Following the 
first pretest round, two of the 23 participants reported their overwhelming, exam-like experiences. 
Beyond the 12th scenario, they reportedly submitted random imputations. Therefore, 24 scenarios 
were eliminated.  
In order to make the participants’ experiences less exam-like, we enriched the remaining 
12 scenarios with additional, descriptive elements. Prior studies on management informed our 
selection of the descriptive elements (e.g., Defourny & Nyssens, 2010; MacKrell & McDonald, 
2014; Zhu et al., 2014). The descriptive elements correspond to the basic setting types (business 
vs. social) as well as more particular scenario descriptions. We embedded the previously selected 
rules and preference arrangements into these descriptive elements. Subsequently, additional 15 
participants were invited to the second pretest round. This round confirmed that the embedding 
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was done effectively. However, some of the descriptions strongly interfered with the participants’ 
attitudes (for instance, an attitude toward the death penalty). After the subsequent modifications, 
nine scenarios remained. A vacation, a sports club, a donation, team building, and an evening 
outing were retained as social settings. In addition, a small business, a candy distribution, a 
corporate board, and an investment were retained as business settings. Eventually, we invited 
another 10 participants for the third pretest round. Their reports suggested the linguistically 
formulated variables were effective. In turn, their self-reports indicated they voted tactically 
whenever they could.   
4.3 Variables 
4.3.1 The Treatment: The participants in our control group only knew their assigned 
preferences and no one else’s. Being informed about the six imaginary members’ preferences, the 
participants in the experiment group were exposed to the increased information asymmetry. Our 
treatment was coded accordingly: the control group (low asymmetry = 0) or the experiment group 
(high asymmetry = 1) (Please refer to Appendix A for the difference in the scenarios between the 
two groups). 
4.3.2 The Moderating Variable: Our moderator was specified as a set of variably 
complex decision rules. Such rules prescribe how the members’ imputations are aggregated into a 
group outcome. The rules ranged from the simple majority over rank vote to points method. The 
aggregation of imputations across the rules reflects an increase in the complexity of their tally 
(Brams & Herschbach, 2001, Conitzer & Sandholm, 2005; Xia & Conitzer, 2010). Notably, the 
simplest rule is the simple majority (Messner & Polborn, 2004). This rule has each participant 
impute a preference for a single option. An outcome is an option that receives more than half of 
all the members’ votes. A more complex rule is the rank vote. This rule has each participant 
impute a preference ordering (Islam et al., 2011; Saari, 2001). An outcome is an option that 
receives most group members’ first rank. Finally, an even more complex rule is the point method 
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(Guinier, 1994; Siegler & Talel, 2005). This rule has each participant distribute an equal number 
of points across all options. Such a distribution accounts for the intensity of their preferences. An 
outcome is an option with the greatest sum of group members’ points. Accordingly, our 
moderator was coded as low complexity (simple majority: rule = 0), moderate complexity (rank 
vote: rule = 1), or high complexity (the points method: rule = 2). (Please refer to Table 1 for the 
scenarios with their respective rules). 
4.3.3 The Dependent Variables: Earlier studies specified a deceptive act as a claim that 
diverges from a standard discussion script (George & Marrett, 2004). An act of effective 
deception was specified as a discussant convincing the group to accept an option that the 
discussant did not sincerely prefer (Marrett & George, 2013). We specified the participant’s 
manipulative imputation as his/her support for an option that is not preferred in accordance with 
the assigned preferences (Sobel, 2001; Taylor, 2002, 2005). Correspondingly, the first dependent 
variable was coded as an authentic (the most preferred imputation; inauthentic = 0) or inauthentic 
imputation (not the most preferred imputation; inauthentic = 1). The participants were prompted 
to impute their preferences. By calculating consequent group outcomes, we specified the 
effectiveness of an inauthentic imputation. Hence, the second dependent variable was coded as an 
ineffective (an inauthentic imputation that does not preclude a less preferred outcome; effective = 
0) or effective manipulative imputation (an inauthentic imputation that precludes a less preferred 
outcome; effective = 1). Finally, all possible outcomes were combined into a third dependent 
variable. This variable was coded as an authentic imputation (manipulate = 0), ineffective 
manipulative imputation (manipulate = 1), or effective manipulative imputation (manipulate = 2). 
4.3.4 The Control Variables: Among our control variables, our first variable controlled 
for the participants’ age. Due to a possible effect of gender on inauthentic disclosures (Dreber & 
Johannesson, 2007; Erat & Gneezy, 2012), our second control variable accounted for the 
participants’ gender (male: gender = 0, female: gender = 1). Furthermore, the concern for others 
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may affect inauthentic imputations. Hence, our third control variable accounted for the 
participants’ social value orientation (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004; Steinel et al., 2010). To this end, 
we used the social value orientation index (Murphy et al., 2011): the greater the social value 
orientation index, the more social is the participant. An overview of the items used to compute 
this index can be found in Appendix B.  
Our fourth control variable accounted for the basic setting type (Defourny & Nyssens, 
2010; MacKrell & McDonald, 2014; Zhu et al., 2014). Across the nine decision scenarios (see 
Table 1), the basic setting type was coded as a business (setting = 0) or social setting (setting = 1). 
Moreover, our fifth control variable accounted for the remaining variability in the nine scenarios. 
These nine scenarios were coded as dummy variables: a vacation club (scenario = 1), a sports 
club (scenario = 2), a corporate board (scenario = 3), a small business (scenario = 4), donations 
(scenario = 5), candy distributor (scenario = 6), investment (scenario = 7), team building 
(scenario = 8), or evening outing (scenario = 9). To avoid a possible sequential effect, the 
participants’ sequential exposure to these scenarios was randomized. Our final control variable 
accounted for the participants’ familiarity with the scenarios. After each scenario, the participants 
responded to: “Did your preference in real life affect your choice in this scenario?” Their 
responses were coded on the Likert scale from “certainly not” (familiarity = 1) to “certainly yes” 
(familiarity = 7).   
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4.4 Manipulation Checks 
If measured simultaneously, the manipulation checks could interfere with the 
measurement of our dependent variable. Therefore, for the manipulation checks we chose another 
independent sample of 27 pretest participants. Testing the effectiveness of the increased 
information asymmetry, we presented the participants with the nine decision scenarios. They 
were asked to pinpoint an opportunity of precluding their less desirable group outcomes. Then we 
tested the difference between the expected and observed distributions of their correctly detected 
opportunities across all the scenarios. χ2 pointed to no difference between them (χ2 = 11.259, d. f. 
= 8, p = 0.1874, n = 27). The pretest participants correctly detected all such opportunities. Thus, 
our treatment was effective.  
Further, testing the effectiveness of the decision rule complexity, we asked these pretest 
participants to rank the rules for their complexity. Their ranks were to range from the least over 
moderately to most complex rule. Specifically, they were expected to rank the simple majority as 
the least complex rule, the rank vote as the moderately complex one, and the point method as the 
most complex one. Then we tested the difference between the expected and observed 
distributions of their ranks. χ2 pointed to no difference between these distributions (χ2 = 2.741, d. 
f. = 2, p = 0.254, n = 27). Therefore, our moderating variable was also effectively manipulated.  
4.5 Experiment Procedure 
Our participants (120 graduate students from a university in Central Europe) were 
assigned to their respective computer booths in a laboratory. They were randomly assigned to the 
control or experiment group. They were presented with on-screen instructions, instructing them to 
read each scenario and impute their information. Their exposure to the scenario sequences was 
also randomized. They were instructed to impute what for them constitutes a favorable outcome. 
All the responses were collected automatically. On average, the experimental group took 57 
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minutes, and the control group took 43 minutes to complete the assignment. Finally, the 
participants’ anonymity was guaranteed, and their participation was compensated.  
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows our participants’ characteristics. On average, the participants’ social value 
orientation falls between individualistic and perfectly equitable (Murphy et al. 2011).  
Group  Age Gender (m/f) Social Value Orientations Total (N) 
 


























Table 2. Participants’ characteristics (standard deviations are in the parentheses) 
 
Table 3 displays the likelihood of different imputations relative to the information 
asymmetry. This gives the initial idea of the participants’ manipulative tendencies and their 
effectiveness. 


























Table 3. Descriptive statistics for authentic and manipulative imputations (standard deviations are 
in the parentheses) 
 
5. 2 Main Analyses 
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Given our categorical measure, we initially employed a logistic regression. As stated 
previously, the first dependent variable is specified as an authentic (inauthentic = 0) or 
inauthentic imputation (inauthentic = 1). The second dependent variable is specified as an 
ineffective (effective = 0) or effective manipulative imputation (effective = 1). Table 4 shows the 
results of our tests for the first and second dependent variables: 
 Authentic vs. Inauthentic 
Imputation 
Ineffective vs. Effective 
Manipulative Imputation 
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TREATMENT:     
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Information asymmetry - Low Asymmetry (baseline)   




TREATMENT * MODERATOR:     
Information asymmetry * Complexity of a decision rule - Low Asymmetry * Simple Majority (baseline) 
Low Asymmetry * Rank Vote  0.095 (0.223)  
-0.481 
(0.412) 
Low Asymmetry * Point Method  0.411* (0.187)  
-1.358*** 
(0.359) 
High Asymmetry * Simple Majority  3.799*** (0.326)  
2.023*** 
(0.543) 
High Asymmetry * Rank Vote  -1.324** (0.416)  
0.001 
(0.697) 






R-squared 0.405 0.426 0.395 0.397 
Statistical significance at *: 95%, **: 99%, ***: 99.9% 
Table 4. Regression results (standard errors are in the parentheses) 
 
H1a posits that the increase of information asymmetry increases the group member’s 
manipulative tendency. The estimated coefficient in the first column of Table 4 (beta high asymmetry = 
2.636, standard error = 0.158) supports H1a. H1b posits that the increase in information 
asymmetry increases the effectiveness of the group member’s manipulative imputation. The 
estimated coefficient in the third column of Table 4 (beta high asymmetry = 2.197, standard error = 
0.261) supports H1b. The models fit the data reasonably well (McFadden’s R-squared = 0.405 
and 0.395, respectively).   
H2a posits that the complexity of a decision rule negatively moderates the effect of 
information asymmetry on the group member’s manipulative tendency. The corresponding result 
is in the second column of Table 4. In the situation where an individual member has information 
on the other members’ preferences (increased information asymmetry), as the decision rule 
becomes increasingly more complex, the tendency to impute inauthentic information becomes 
ever more reduced (beta high asymmetry * simple majority = 3.799; standard error = 0.326; beta high asymmetry * 
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rank vote = -1.324; standard error = 0.416; beta high asymmetry * point method = -1.896, standard error = 
0.404). However, in the situation of low information asymmetry, the most complex decision rule 
increases the tendency to impute inauthentic information (beta low asymmetry * point method = 0.411, 
standard error = 0.187). Hence, H2a is partially supported. Further, H2b posits that the 
complexity of a decision rule negatively moderates the effect of information asymmetry on the 
effectiveness of the group member’s manipulative imputation. The corresponding result is in the 
fourth column of Table 4. If the information asymmetry is high, the least complex decision rule 
increases the effectiveness of the group member’s manipulative imputation (beta high asymmetry * simple 
majority = 2.023, standard error = 0.543). However, if the information asymmetry is low, then the 
most complex rule reduces the effectiveness of the group member’s manipulative imputation 
(beta low asymmetry * point method = -1.358, standard error = 0.359). Hence, H2b is partially supported. 
Among the modifiers, there are several interesting findings: while the participant’s social 
value orientation surprisingly increases the tendency to impute inauthentic information (beta social 
value orientation = 0.014, standard error = 0.005), it reduces the effectiveness of manipulative 
imputation (beta social value orientation = -0.017, standard error = 0.009). Moreover, while familiarity 
with the scenarios increases the tendency to impute inauthentic information (beta familiarity score = 
0.121, standard error = 0.035), it reduces the effectiveness of manipulative imputation (beta 
familiarity score = -0.148, standard error = 0.057). The reason for the first peculiar finding could be 
because the participants did not interact with real group members, while the reason for the second 
finding could be the participant’s over-confidence. 
Finally, we ran multinomial regressions on the third dependent variable. This variable 
was specified as an authentic (manipulate = 0), ineffective manipulative (manipulate = 1), or 
effective manipulative imputation (manipulate = 2). Table 5 shows the results of the multinomial 
regression analyses. 














































Basic Setting - Business (baseline)     









































































TREATMENT:      
Information asymmetry - Low Asymmetry (baseline) 
High asymmetry 0.851*** 
(0.232) 
3.306*** 
(0.187)   
TREATMENT * MODERATOR:     
Information asymmetry * Complexity of a decision rule: Low Asymmetry * Simple Majority (baseline) 
Low Asymmetry * Rank Vote   0.398  (0.339) 
-0.079 
(0.270) 
Low Asymmetry * Point Method   1.043*** -0.219 
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(0.278) (0.253) 
High Asymmetry * Simple Majority   1.757** (0.560) 
4.012*** 
(0.338) 
High Asymmetry * Rank Vote   -0.855 (0.688) 
-0.953* 
(0.457) 
High Asymmetry * Point Method 







R-squared 0.408 0.408 0.432 0.432 
Statistical significance at *: 95%, **: 99%, ***: 99.9% 
Table 5. The effects on manipulative imputations (the authentic imputation is the baseline; 
standard errors are in the parentheses) 
 
The results in Table 5 are generally consistent with the results in Table 4. The 
multinomial analyses entirely support H1a and H1b, and partially support H2a and H2b. While 
the former two hypotheses are quite straightforward, the latter two require a further explanation.  
Essentially, H2 posits that rule complexity negatively moderates the effect of increased 
information asymmetry on the tendency to submit inauthentic information and the effectiveness 
of manipulative imputation. In the situation of high information asymmetry, if the decision rule is 
the least complex, the individual group member is more likely to impute inauthentic information 
(beta high asymmetry * simple majority = 1.757, standard error = 0.560), effectively manipulating a group 
outcome (beta high asymmetry * simple majority = 4.012, standard error = 0.338). Given an increase in 
information asymmetry, an increase in the rule complexity decreases the likelihood of an 
inauthentic imputation (beta high asymmetry * rank vote = -0.855, standard error = 0.688; beta high asymmetry * 
point method = -1.281, standard error = 0.640). This also holds for the effectiveness of manipulative 
imputation (beta high asymmetry * rank vote = -0.953, standard error = 0.457; beta high asymmetry * point method = 
-1.159, standard error = 0.465). However, in the situation of low information asymmetry with 
the most complex rule, the participant is more likely to impute inauthentic information (beta low 
asymmetry * point method = 1.043, standard error = 0.278). Nonetheless, he/she is unlikely to be effective 
at favorably manipulating a group outcome. In this situation, we see the evidence of a chance 
21  
behavior. Since the decision rule is so complex, even without knowing the other group members’ 
preferences, an individual is tempted to manipulate a group outcome, by taking a chance on this. 
The next section presents a more detailed discussion of the findings. 
6. Discussion 
Individuals may attempt deceiving acts within group settings. They are more likely to do 
this if their groups are supported by distributed communications (Barkhi et al., 1998, 2004; 
Marrett & George, 2013). However, the effectiveness of their attempts on supported group 
decisions has not been clear (Marrett & George, 2013). In line with these findings, we subjected 
the group members’ manipulative attempts to the impact of the two systemic features of 
distributed support. Our study examined how information asymmetry and rule complexity 
influence the group member’s manipulative tendency and its effectiveness on supported group 
decisions. 
Providing information on the other members’ conflicting incentives increases the group 
member’s manipulative tendency. Given the simple decision rule, doing so also increases the 
effectiveness of the member’s manipulative imputation. As the decision rule is made more 
complex, the inability to cope with the additional complexity burdens the member’s manipulative 
tendency. Interestingly, a feature of a decision rule may give the member an option to ‘stake the 
odds,’ by imputing inauthentic information. The member is likely to take this chance, even if 
he/she does not have any information about the other members’ preferences. Specifically, the 
most complex rule in our experiment, i.e. the point method, requires from each participant to 
distribute a pre-specified number of points across all possible options (e.g., “Among options a, b, 
and c, I prefer option b three times more than option a, and option a two times more than option 
c”). Such a distribution accounts for the intensity of the member’s preferences. An outcome is an 
option with the greatest sum of all the group members’ points. Without knowing the preferences 
of the other members, our participants overemphasized the intensity of their authentic 
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preferences. They did so in a bid to assure the group outcome that is more favorable to them. 
However, without knowing the other members’ preferences, simply ‘staking the odds’ turned out 
ineffective. Despite the ineffectiveness, this finding additionally points to the susceptibility of 
systemic GDSS features to manipulative imputations.  
Our other findings concern control variables. While the social value orientation increases 
the participants’ tendency to impute inauthentic information, it reduces the effectiveness of their 
manipulative imputations on supported group decisions. A lack of interaction with the other 
group members in the experiment setting could have caused this peculiar finding. Moreover, 
while the familiarity with the scenarios increases the participants’ tendency to impute inauthentic 
information, it also reduces the effectiveness of their manipulative imputation. A possible reason 
for this is the participants’ over-confidence. Notably, over-confidence may lead individuals to 
rush with their imputations (Harvey, 1997; Moore & Healy, 2008). It may be interesting for 
future studies to further explore these effects. 
6.1 Research Contributions 
Our study makes a number of important research advances. First, we holistically 
examined the incidence and effectiveness of the group member’s manipulative influences over 
supported group decisions. Earlier works mainly focused on the incidence, while ignoring the 
effectiveness. Our findings thus enrich the existing GDSS literature, and are an important 
stepping stone toward future studies that delve deeper into the effectiveness of manipulative 
imputations in distributed GDSS settings. 
Second, most GDSS studies (e.g., Barkhi et al., 1998, 2004) compared the group 
members’ exchange of inauthentic information between different physical features of GDSS 
settings (i.e., distributed versus collocated). Their common finding is that the exchange of 
inauthentic information is more prevalent in a distributed GDSS setting. Our study delved deeper 
into the distributed GDSS setting by examining the effect of two systemic features, i.e., 
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information asymmetry and decision rule complexity, on an individual member’s tendency to 
impute inauthentic information. By eliminating the group member’s interactions with the other 
group members, we eliminated the potential social considerations that may emerge from such 
interactions (i.e., we presented the experiment participants with six other imaginary group 
members). By doing so, we isolated the effects of the systemic GDSS features on the group 
member’s manipulation tendency and its effectiveness. Future studies can build on our findings, 
by introducing and manipulating the social aspects, e.g., conducting an experiment with the group 
members being the participants’ friends versus strangers.  
Third, our findings inform the framework of information aggregation. Recall that this 
framework explains distributed decisions “through principles of minimization of uncertainty or 
maximization of predictability under information pooling over many individuals” (Bettencourt, 
2009, pp. 598). Our findings show that an increase in the information asymmetry decreases the 
uncertainty of an effectively manipulated information aggregation outcome. However, the 
complexity of an information aggregation rule may suppress the effectiveness of an individual’s 
manipulation, by increasing the uncertainty of such an outcome. The framework can be 
augmented and extrapolated, by including more complex manipulative behaviors into the 
analysis. In view of the pervasive impact of coalitions on supported group decisions (e.g., Burnett 
et al., 2014; French, 2007; Kilgour et al., 2001; Li et al., 20014; Xu et al., 2010), future research 
can extend ours, by studying more complex manipulative behaviors. Some such behaviors are: 1) 
coalitions that coordinate manipulative imputations, 2) strategic proposals that manipulate 
information aggregation, or 3) agenda rigging influences (French, 2007). 
Fourth, our results have some consequences for the design of organizations. Some 
researchers refer to prediction markets that organizations use to support corporate decisions as 
GDSS (O'Leary, 2015). Such markets are designed to aggregate information from different 
sources with market prices reflecting the magnitude of support for available options (Chen et al., 
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2013; O'Leary, 2015). Whereas the success of these markets depends on participants’ contributed 
information, the reliability of their contribution is an issue (Chen et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2015). 
On the one hand, there is the inconsistency between the participants’ surveyed and true 
preferences, as revealed during and/or after participation. Notably, up to 27% participants 
misstate their true preferences (Chen et al., 2013). In other words, the influence of information 
aggregation on stated preferences points to the inaccuracy of their disclosure. On the other hand, 
information traders who trade on specific information in a prediction market are themselves 
subject to information asymmetries (O'Leary, 2015). By affecting the information aggregation 
efficiency, the transparency of contributed information impedes such trading behaviors, rather 
than enticing them (Yang et al., 2015). Therefore, our findings strengthen the insight that less 
transparent information opens the door for deceptive acts. However, more research is needed on 
institutionally structured arrangements that minimize deception, and encourage trust facilitating 
exchanges. 
6.2 Implications for Practitioners 
Opportunities to assure a more desirable or preclude a less desirable group outcome 
incentivize team members’ manipulative behaviors. If there are competing interests on a 
manager’s team, he/she can suppress or decrease the effectiveness of the members’ attempted 
manipulations. A straightforward approach is for the manager to deprive any team member of 
knowledge of the other team members’ competing interests. An alternative approach relies on the 
complexity. This complexity should be understood as the complexity of the team members’ 
manipulation calculus. This complexity can also suppress or decrease the effectiveness of the 
team members’ attempted manipulations: for example, the manager can make the 
interdependence of the team members’ competing interests more ambiguous. This would result in 
the team member’s more authentic information disclosures. Thus, if issues under consideration 
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are more complex, this will naturally result in their more authentic disclosures, due to the 
complexity of manipulation calculus. 
In short, our advice is for managers to be well informed on issues reflecting the 
interdependence of their team members’ competing interests. We advise them to cultivate the 
sensibility not only to the team members’ manipulative imputations, but also to their more 
general information-managing behaviors. Such knowledge may also improve the design of GDSS 
features that prevent manipulative imputations. In this respect, the more cogent understanding of 
the susceptibility of a distributed support structure to such imputations is our contribution to the 
analysis and design of GDSS. 
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Appendix A – Experiment Scenarios 
1. The Scenarios with No Access to Other People’s Preferences  
Scenario 1.1: There are seven members in your vacation club. The club is to hold a vote 
on where to spend a summer vacation: the Azores, the Bahamas, or the Canaries. Personally, you 
prefer the Canaries to the Azores, but would not like the Bahamas. Please assign your single vote 
to a destination of your choice. A destination that receives the most votes wins. 
The Azores: __.  The Canaries: __.  The Bahamas: __.  
 
Scenario 1.2: You are a member of a sports club board. The board is composed of seven 
members, and you are to vote on whether to set up a section for basketball, football, or handball. 
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Personally, you prefer football to basketball, but do not like handball. You are an insider. Please 
assign your single vote to a sports activity of your choice. A sports activity to receive the most 
votes wins. 
Handball: __. Football: __. Basketball: __.  
 
Scenario 1.3: Seven corporate board members are to travel to a ski resort. You are to vote 
on whether to travel to Aspen, Chamonix, or Cortina. Personally, you prefer Chamonix to 
Cortina, but do not like Aspen. Please assign your single vote to a ski resort of your choice. A ski 
resort to receive the most votes wins. 
Cortina: __.  Aspen: __.  Chamonix: __.  
 
Scenario 1.4: You are a member of a small business association. There are altogether 
seven members. These members are about to vote what business magazine to subscribe to: 
Forbes, BusinessWeek, or Fortune. Everyone will rank the magazines, and submit their rankings 
to the vote. You prefer Forbes to Fortune, but do not like BusinessWeek. Please rank the three 
magazines. Please do so by choosing 1, 2, or 3 next to each of them. A magazine to receive the 
most first ranks wins. 
BusinessWeek: __.  Forbes: __.  Fortune: __.  
 
Scenario 1.5: You are a member of a committee on donations. The committee is 
composed of seven members, and is to vote on whether to make a donation to a political 
campaign, institution of fine arts, or charitable event. Everyone will rank the donations, and 
submit their rankings to the vote. You prefer the institution of fine arts to the charitable event. 
You do not want to contribute to the political campaign. Please rank the three donations. Please 
do so by choosing 1, 2, or 3 next to each of them. A donation to receive the most first ranks wins. 
The Charitable Event: __.  The Institution of F          
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Scenario 1.6: You are a shareholder of a candy distributor. There are altogether seven 
shareholders, and all are to vote on a new supplier: Nestle SA, Hershey Foods Corporation, or 
Mars Inc. Everyone will rank the suppliers, and submit their rankings to the vote. You prefer 
Mars Inc. to Nestle SA. You do not like Hershey Foods Corporation. Please rank the three 
suppliers. Please do so by choosing 1, 2, or 3 next to each of them. A supplier to receive the most 
first ranks wins. 
Mars Inc.: __.  Hershey Foods Corporation: __.  Nestle SA: __. 
 
Scenario 1.7: You are a member of an investment committee. The committee is 
composed of seven members, and is to vote on whether to invest in rice, corn, or soybeans. Each 
committee member will get three votes that are to be distributed across these three investments. 
Since you prefer soybeans to corn, and you do not like rice, you would give 2 votes to soybeans, 
1 vote to corn, and 0 votes to rice. Please distribute your three votes across these three 
investments. The total sum of your votes has to equal three. An investment to receive the most 
votes wins. 
Rice: __.  Soybeans: __.  Corn: __. 
 
Scenario 1.8: Seven team members are to vote on a specific team building activity: 
paintball, bungee jumping, or rafting. Each team member will distribute three votes across these 
three activities. Since you prefer rafting to paintball, and you do not like bungee jumping, you 
would give 2 votes to rafting, 1 vote to paintball, and 0 votes to bungee jumping. Please distribute 
your three votes across these three activities. The total sum of your votes has to equal three. An 
activity to receive the most votes wins. 
Rafting: __.  Bungee Jumping: __.  Paintball: __. 
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Scenario 1.9: You and other six colleagues are to spend an evening out. You are to vote 
on whether to enjoy a symphony, theater play, or musical. Each manager will get three votes to 
distribute across these three outings. Since you prefer the theater to the musical, and you do not 
like the symphony, you would give 2 votes to the theater, 1 vote to the musical, and 0 votes to the 
symphony. Please distribute your three votes across these three options. The total sum of your 
votes has to equal three. An option to receive the most votes wins. 
The Musical: __.  The Symphony: __.  The Theater Play: __. 
 
2. The Scenarios With Access to Other People’s Preferences 
Scenario 2.1: There are seven members in your vacation club. The club is to hold a vote 
on where to spend a summer vacation: the Azores, the Bahamas, or the Canaries. Personally, you 
prefer the Canaries to the Azores, but would not like the Bahamas. All these other six members 
would give 3 votes to the Bahamas and 3 votes to the Azores. Please assign your vote to a single 
destination of your choice. A destination that receives the most votes wins. 
The Azores: __.  The Canaries: __.  The Bahamas: __.  
 
Scenario 2.2: You are a member of a sports club board. The board is composed of seven 
members, and you are to vote on whether to set up a section for basketball, football, or handball. 
Personally, you prefer football to basketball, but do not like handball. Among these other six 
members, three members prefer basketball, and the other three members prefer handball. Please 
assign your single vote to a sports activity. A sports activity to receive the most votes wins. 
Handball: __.  Football: __. Basketball: __.  
 
Scenario 2.3: Seven corporate board members are to travel to a ski resort. You are to vote 
on whether to travel to Aspen, Chamonix, or Cortina. Personally, you prefer Chamonix to 
Cortina, but do not like Aspen. Among these other six board members, three members are in 
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favor of Aspen, and the remaining three members are in favor of Cortina. Please assign your 
single vote to a ski resort. A ski resort to receive the most votes wins. 
Cortina: __.  Aspen: __.  Chamonix: __.  
 
Scenario 2.4: You are a member of a small business association. There are altogether 
seven members. These members are about to vote what business magazine to subscribe to: 
Forbes, BusinessWeek, or Fortune. Everyone will rank the magazines, and submit their rankings 
to the vote. You prefer Forbes to Fortune, but do not like BusinessWeek. These other six 
members would give 3 first ranks and 3 third ranks to BusinessWeek, 1 second rank, 3 first ranks, 
and 2 third ranks to Fortune, and 1 third rank and 5 second ranks to Forbes. Please rank the three 
magazines. Please do so by choosing 1, 2, or 3 next to each of them. A magazine to receive the 
most first ranks wins. 
BusinessWeek: __.  Forbes: __.  Fortune: __.  
 
Scenario 2.5: You are a member of a committee on donations. The committee is 
composed of seven members, and is to vote on whether to make a donation to a political 
campaign, institution of fine arts, or charitable event. Everyone will rank the donations, and 
submit their rankings to the vote. You prefer the institution of fine arts to the charitable event. 
You do not want to contribute to the political campaign. These other six members would give 1 
third rank, 2 second ranks, and 3 first ranks to the political campaign, 4 third ranks and 2 second 
ranks to the fine arts, and 1 third rank, 3 first ranks, and 2 second ranks to the charitable event. 
Please rank the three donations. Please do so by choosing 1, 2, or 3 next to each of them. A 
donation to receive the most first ranks wins. 
The Charitable Event: __.  The Institution of Fine A rts: __.  The Political C am paign: __.  
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Scenario 2.6: You are a shareholder of a candy distributor. There are altogether seven 
shareholders, and all are to vote on a new supplier: Nestle SA, Hershey Foods Corporation, or 
Mars Inc. Everyone will rank the suppliers, and submit their rankings to the vote. You prefer 
Mars Inc. to Nestle SA. You do not like Hershey Foods Corporation. These other six shareholders 
would give 1 second rank, 2 third ranks, and 3 first ranks to Hershey Foods Corporation, 1 third 
rank and 5 second ranks to Mars, and 3 first ranks and 3 third ranks to Nestle SA. Please rank the 
three suppliers. Please do so by choosing 1, 2, or 3 next to each of them. A supplier to receive the 
most first ranks wins. 
Mars Inc.  : __.  Hershey Foods Corporation: __.  Nestle SA: __. 
 
Scenario 2.7: You are a member of an investment committee. The committee is 
composed of seven members, and is to vote on whether to invest in rice, corn, or soybeans. Each 
committee member has three votes that are to be distributed across these three investments. Since 
you prefer soybeans to corn, and you do not like rice, you would give 2 votes to soybeans, 1 vote 
to corn, and 0 votes to rice. These six members would give 7 votes to corn, 6 votes to rice, and 5 
votes to soybeans. Please distribute your 3 votes across these three investments. The total sum of 
your votes has to equal 3. An investment to receive the most votes wins. 
Rice: __.  Soybeans: __.  Corn: __. 
 
Scenario 2.8: Seven team members are to vote on a specific team building activity: 
paintball, bungee jumping, or rafting. Each team member will distribute three votes across these 
three activities. Since you prefer rafting to paintball, and you do not like bungee jumping, you 
would give 2 votes to rafting, 1 vote to paintball, and 0 votes to bungee jumping. These six 
members would give 8 votes to bungee jumping, 6 votes to paintball, and 4 votes to rafting. 
Please distribute your 3 votes across these three activities. The total sum of your votes has to 
equal 3. An activity to receive the most votes wins. 
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Rafting: __.  Bungee Jumping: __.  Paintball: __. 
 
Scenario 2.9: You and other six colleagues are to spend an evening out. You are to vote 
on whether to enjoy a symphony, theater play, or musical. Each manager will get three votes to 
distribute across these three outings. Since you prefer the theater to the musical, and you do not 
like the symphony, you would give 2 votes to the theater, 1 vote to the musical, and 0 votes to the 
symphony. These six managers would give 7 votes to the theater play, 2 votes to the symphony, 
and 9 votes to the musical. Please distribute your 3 votes across these three options. The total sum 
of your votes has to equal 3. An option to receive the most votes wins. 
The Musical: __.  The Symphony: __.  The Theater Play: __. 
 
Appendix B – Social Value Orientation Questionnaire 
We employed a questionnaire (Murphy et al. 2011) in order to compute this orientation. Our 
participants were asked to choose a position on a nine point scale between 1) being altruistic and 
competitive, 2) individualistic and equitable, 3) individualistic and altruistic, 4) competitive and 
individualistic, 5) altruistic and equitable, and 6) equitable and competitive. An index is then 
computed as: 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = arctan �𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜−50
𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠−50
� where 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 is the mean allocation for the subject, and 𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜 is 




Table 1. Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 Column 9   
Altruistic 
50 54 59 63 68 72 76 81 85 
Competitive 
100 89 79 68 58 47 36 26 15 
  150 143 138 131 126 119 112 107 100   
  
Table 2. Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 Column 9   
Individualistic 
100 98 96 94 93 91 89 87 85 
Equitable 
50 54 59 63 68 72 76 81 85 
  150 152 155 157 161 163 165 168 170   
  
Table 3. Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 Column 9   
Individualistic 
100 94 87 81 75 69 63 56 50 
Altruistic 
50 56 63 69 75 81 87 94 100 
 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150  
  
Table 4. Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 Column 9   
Competitive 
85 87 89 91 93 94 96 98 100 
Individualistic 
15 19 24 28 33 37 41 46 50 
 100 106 113 119 126 131 137 144 150  
  
Table 5. Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 Column 9   
Altruistic 
50 54 59 63 68 72 76 81 85 
Equitable 
100 98 96 94 93 91 89 87 85 
  150 152 155 157 161 163 165 168 170   
 
Table 6. Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 Column 9   
Equitable 
85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Competitive 85 76 68 59 50 41 33 24 15 
  170 161 153 144 135 126 118 109 100   
